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Abstract 
 
Extending subsidiary embeddedness and strategy literature, we conceptualise the role of 
subsidiary ‘multiple’ internal embeddedness in determining different subsidiary strategic 
options. Building on the notion of ‘structural’ embeddedness found in prior research, we 
distinguish three levels of ‘internal’ subsidiary embeddedness (corporate, network, and self-
reliant) using measures of hierarchy.  We also identify three types of subsidiary strategy 
(horizontal integration, lateral integration, and diversification) in the context of information 
technology (IT) Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to examine in-depth whether and how 
levels of internal embeddedness interacts and leads to distinctively different subsidiary 
strategies. Subsequently, we offer a conceptual model, at the subsidiary level, to illustrate 
how these relationships are interplayed, based on a sample of 1866 subsidiaries of the eight 
largest global IT MNEs across four continents (Europe, North America, Asia, and Africa). 
Subsidiary location is also found to be an important moderator of the interplay. Implications 
for future research on the relationship between multiple subsidiary internal embeddedness 
and subsidiary strategies are discussed and managerial implications are outlined.       
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1. Introduction  
 
The contemporary MNEs are moving away from a simpler form of hierarchy (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989) to a much more complex arrangement of an interdependent network 
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). In particular, under the interdependent network structure, a 
crucial consideration is the designation of strategic options to globally dispersed subsidiaries 
in order to maximise distinctive subsidiary internal capabilities and local opportunities 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002; Yamin and Sinkovics, 2010; Andersson et al., 2002; Figueiredo, 
2011; Hallin et al., 2011). Therefore, it is commonly acknowledged that while subsidiary 
strategies can be largely designated by headquarters (Yamin and Forsgren, 2006), 
differentiated subsidiary capabilities are an important contributory factor to the decision on 
which local strategy a subsidiary should pursue (Meyer et al., 2011; Ciabuschi et al., 2014).  
 One explanation for the development of idiosyncratic internal capability is the internal 
embeddedness experienced by individual subsidiaries. Because each subsidiary is part of the 
internal and local network, it is exposed to both internal and external resources (Fang et al., 
2007; Meyer et al., 2011).  Such exposure allows valuable exchanges to take place between 
the subsidiary and counterparts in the same networks. Over time, the subsidiary is able to 
develop its unique set of resources and capabilities, and subsequently contribute to 
technological and/or market development of the MNE (Birkinshaw, 1996; Andersson et al., 
2002; Ciabuschi et al., 2014; Johanson and Vahlne, 2009). However, given the importance of 
subsidiary internal embeddedness in determining subsidiary capabilities (Andersson et al., 
2002; Yu, 2011), and the importance of subsidiary capabilities on local strategic pursuits 
which contribute to the MNE’s overall performance (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001), research 
which systematically examines the direct link between subsidiary internal embeddedness and 
subsidiary strategy remains limited (UNCTAD, 2016). In particular, while there has been 
extant literature on relational embeddedness, less attention has been paid to structural 
embeddedness in examining MNE internal organization (Granovetter, 1992).  
  Building on the structural embeddedness literature (e.g. Granovetter 1992; 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Gulati 1998), the definition that structural embeddedness is “the 
impersonal configuration of linkages between people or units” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
1998:244), and Garcia-Pont et al’s (2009) work on the importance of embeddedness as a 
component of subsidiary strategy, the main purpose of this paper is to extend current 
literature on the relationship between subsidiary strategy and internal embeddedness by 
investigating explicitly whether and how different types of subsidiary structural 
embeddedness and subsidiary strategies interact. We build upon and extend the existing 
literature on subsidiary embeddedness and strategy by conceptualising degrees of structural 
embeddedness to reflect the relationship between the subsidiaries and other stakeholders, i.e. 
other subsidiaries and HQ, within the MNE network. In so doing, we hope to shed some new 
light on how levels of subsidiary structural embeddedness can be used to determine different 
types of subsidiary strategy. We apply this investigation in the context of the global IT sector 
(Grosse, 1996; Tan and Vertinsky, 1996; Lee et al., 2010; Ciabuschi et al., 2014).      
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we first review relevant key 
literature on strategy and embeddedness, and then we reflect on the characteristics of the IT 
sector and formulate a number of propositions and a specific model; in section 3, we discuss 
the methodology and data used; this is followed by section 4, where we analyse the data; 
finally, in section 5, we discuss our findings and relevant theoretical contributions and 
practical implications, and conclude with the limitations of the study and recommendations 
for future research.  
2. Subsidiary Structural Embeddedness  
 
Building on the Integration-Responsiveness framework (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2002), the 
traditional MNE structure gradually shifted towards designating global or regional production 
mandates to subsidiaries located in lower-cost countries, and global research and 
development mandates to subsidiaries with strong capabilities and in advantageous locations 
as regards technical resources. As a result, production capacity and responsibilities among 
different subsidiaries have changed to become either distinctively broader or narrower. On 
the contrary, traditionally globalised MNEs such as Japanese firms gradually shifted towards 
allocating more resources and responsibilities overseas by increasing investments (Asakawa 
2001). This enables subsidiaries in advantageous locations (low labour costs, better sourcing, 
or more learning opportunities) to be allocated broader mandates. Chen and Cannice’s (2006) 
study found that manufacturing subsidiaries in developing economies can enjoy cost 
reductions through economies of scale when they have a broader mandate. Globally-
mandated production subsidiaries are also found in a study by Andersson and Fredriksson 
(1996) where it is shown that high inter-organisational trade across borders has grown 
drastically since the 1980s. Kobrin (1991) came to a similar conclusion, that the global 
interdependence of MNE value chain activities was taking its shape in a particular manner, as 
evidenced by the increasing level of intra-firm trade across borders.  Under this structure, 
subsidiaries are interdependent due to designated global, regional and local mandates, and 
therefore capitalise on diverse capabilities and resources in a co-ordinated manner for the 
interests of the global, regional and local markets (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1998; Prahalad and 
Doz, 1987).  Hence, the notion of ‘multiple embeddedness’ (Ferraris, 2014) becomes relevant. 
Meyer et al. (2011:12) explain the concept of ‘multiple embeddedness’ to affect ‘their 
[subsidiaries] strategic significance and contribution to the overall MNE competitiveness’, 
highlighting the important relationship between embeddedness and strategy. There are two 
major components in embeddedness: i.e. internal and external. In this paper we focus on the 
internal embeddedness dimension, which we follow the definition by Giabuschi et al. 
(2011:1613): “the internal relationships of subsidiaries with sister subsidiaries and 
headquarters”.  
  There is wide discussion in the literature about the relation between ownership 
structure and control on subsidiaries. For example, Mudambi’s (2011) recent discussion of 
the link between ownership and control proposes the principle idea that ownership and 
control strongly coincide.  That is, when the ownership share of a subsidiary is high, the 
degree of control from the headquarters is also likely to be high. This argument corresponds 
to the latest World Investment Report by UNCTAD (2016) which examines how complex 
corporate structures can be explained by the relationship between ownership and control. In 
particular, despite the possibility of tax avoidance and financing associated with ownership 
and control, the report asserts that the growing complexity of MNE structure strongly reflects 
operational and strategic considerations from managerial perspective, in seeking of effective 
global production networks. A number of studies have echoed this assertion.  
Chang and Taylor (1999) distinguish between single and multi-parent ownership and 
between output and staffing control.  Their results on Korean subsidiaries showed that both 
output and staffing reporting was increasing with the degree of ownership, i.e. higher for a 
single owner compared to multiple owners. Similarly, Yafeh (2000) departs from the 
financial setting of understanding the Japanese model of corporate governance and points 
how such a model could encourage the “accumulation of firm specific knowledge and capital 
by employees, suppliers and financial institutions” (p. 82-83) thus relating ownership 
structure to the social links that develop among internal and external stakeholders in an MNE 
group. More recently, Guest and Sutherland (2010) and Altomonte and Rungi (2013) assert 
that the MNE should be viewed as a cross-border ‘Business Group’ which organizes the 
exchange of resources under a common hierarchy. Guest and Sutherland (2010) particularly 
discuss how business groups in China are highly committed to the distribution of intangible 
management resources to first-tier subsidiaries. Consequently, it would be too narrow to 
claim that ownership structure and control simply gives information on the financial or 
administrative structure of the multinational.  On the contrary, it provides information on 
‘specific business relationships’: a subsidiary is formulating with other stakeholders in the 
group (Andersson and Forsgren, 1996; Rowley et al, 2000). In particular, a multilayer 
structure of ownership and control underlines the diversified nature of resource dependence 
within an MNE and thus accepts the fact that the organizational structure of contemporary 
MNEs moves away from strict hierarchies where the focal point of control is residing with 
the headquarters (Altomonde and Rungi, 2013).  Thus, subsidiaries can develop multiple 
relationships within the MNE which eventually form the subsidiary’s environment in which it 
is embedded.   
 The notion of embeddedness has its intellectual routes in the analysis of social capital 
and social networks (Polanyi, 1957; Coleman, 1988; Burt, 1997) which as stated by Uzzi 
(1997, p. 35) “advances our understanding of how social structure affects economic life”. 
Inter-organisational theory addresses the issue of internal complexity in MNCs and the ties of 
interdependence that are formed among subsidiaries and headquarters (Ghoshal and Nohria, 
1989). The importance of the concept of network in understanding the evolution of such a 
complex institution as the MNC is brought forward in Bartlett and Ghoshal, (1990) 
who  ”conceptualize the multinational as a network of exchange relationships among 
different organizational units, including the headquarters and the different national 
subsidiaries that are collectively embedded in … a structured context.” (p.604). In this 
respect, seminal is seen to be Granovetter’s contribution. Granovetter’s (1973) article 
analyses social networks and the importance of the strength of ties that links members of 
networks.  He claims that although emphasis is placed conveniently on strong ties among 
group members, it is weak ties that extend the network as they can provide access to multiple 
sources of new knowledge and information. Burt (1992, 2001 and 2009) with his work on 
structural holes has formalised the importance of the so-called weak ties which nevertheless 
constitute important sources of innovation. Granovetter, thus, further addresses the issue of 
embeddedness in the context of a solid system of social relations as a factor of minimizing 
opportunistic behavior among members of a network. In this context embeddedness embraces 
interdependence and thus moves away from the pure dyadic relationship prescribed by 
Williamson (1975). In turn, interdependence within a network evolves over time and is 
reflected in the interconnectedness among network members and as such it could reflect both 
atomistic as well as social relations in the network (Uzzi, 1997). Hence, two types of 
embeddedness have been identified by Granovetter (1992), structural and relational. Similarly, 
Andersson et al (2001) argue that subsidiary embeddedness within a business network should 
be considered along two dimensions - ‘the attributes of a subsidiary’s relationship with its 
network’, and ‘the position of a subsidiary in the network’. Thus, the definition offered by 
Gulati (1998) and Rowley et al (2000) breaks down subsidiary embeddedness into two 
dimensions: relational and structural. To consider either dimension of embeddedness, 
Rowley et al (2000:371) point out that the analysis should initiate from the ‘intensity of ties’ 
between a subsidiary and the rest of the MNE, which are conditioned upon MNE control and 
ownership strategy in place.  
 Specifically, according to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998, p.244) structural 
embeddedness is defined as “the impersonal configuration of linkages between people or 
units”.  In contrast, relational embeddedness describes the quality of the network ties actors 
that developed through time. In their article they argue on the importance of both the 
structural and relational embeddedness in the creation of intellectual capital (alongside the 
cognitive dimension). Gulati (1998) argues embeddedness is the quest to minimize 
uncertainty in a network as it facilitates information sharing where structural embeddedness 
reflects the positional perspective on network whilst relational embeddedness the cohesion 
perspective. Further research establishes the importance of structural embeddedness in 
understanding the shaping of competitive and strategic dynamics within networks of firms 
(Provan 1993; Gulati 1999).  Thus, structural embeddedness constitutes an important 
dimension in the study of strategic activity “in the social and other contexts in which it is so 
richly embedded” (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001, p. 443).  
 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
It is the work of Freeman (1978) and Freeman et al. (1979) that has provided key 
measurements of structural embeddedness deriving from his research on structural centrality 
in networks1. In this paper, to measure structural embeddedness, we follow Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal (1998, p.244) who assert that density, connectivity, and/or hierarchy, can be used to 
describe the “presence or absence of network ties between actors; network configuration or 
morphology”. Similarly, Sismek et al (2003) identify four different measures of structural 
dimension of embeddedness: “closure, density, connectivity, and hierarchy” (p. 430). These 
measures are variably adapted by a number of empirical studies (e.g. Gulati 1999; Gilsing 
and Nooteboom, 2006; Gilsing et al., 2008; Rowely et al., 2000 and Moran, 2005). Continue 
with this tradition, we build on the notion of  structural embeddedness  and  the measure of  
‘hierarchy’ to argue that subsidiaries will exhibit varying degrees of embeddedness within the 
MNE network signaling not only the departure from hierarchical organizational structures but 
also the adoption of production ties beyond those reflecting horizontal or vertical production 
                                                          
1 See Scott (2012) for an exhaustive analysis on social network analysis measures. 
strategies (Mudambi, 2011).  Specifically, using the measure of ‘hierarchy’ we distinguish 
three levels of subsidiary structural embeddedness within the MNE internal network 
depending on their hierarchical ‘distance’ to the headquarters. The term ‘hierarchical distance’ 
is used to describe “the length of the command chain linking each affiliate to the parent 
company” (Altomonte and Rungi 2013:10). The three identified levels of structural 
embeddedness are: corporate embeddedness (represents low distance to headquarters), self-
reliant embeddedness (represents high distance to headquarters), and network embeddedness 
(represents moderate distance to headquarters and rest of the network). In the context of  
Granovetter’s and Burt’s work on  weak ties and structural holes respectively  then corporate 
and network embeddedness would represent strong ties whilst self-reliant embeddedness 
would represent weak ties or structural holes respectively. While a subsidiary can be 
structurally embedded in more than one structural relationship, we take a particular focus on 
the direct dyadic relationship between the focal subsidiary and the ultimate headquarters. 
Thus, the hierarchy variable allows us to identify the strong and weak ties in MNEs and relate 
those to the strategic profiles of subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, we draw on the argument of Bloom et al (2012) that different resource 
creation and exchange between headquarters and various subsidiaries reflect the differing 
hierarchical distances and structural embeddedness, which in turn explain the different 
subsidiary profiles (Bloom et al, 2012), we distinguish four different subsidiary strategies by 
extending the works of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), White and Poynter (1984), Caves (1996), 
and Oladottir et al. (2012) where we identify four main types of subsidiary strategies: 
horizontal integration, vertical integration, lateral integration, and diversification. Specifically, 
a horizontal integration strategy is defined as the duplication of the home-market activities of 
the firm in foreign locations (Caves, 1996); vertical integration is defined as maximisation of 
operational efficiency and cost minimisation and is less about local opportunity exploitation; 
lateral integration strategy is concerned with resource-seeking operations, ranging from 
lower-cost inputs to strategic assets(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Helpman, 1985); and we 
define diversification strategy as locating business activities in a number of markets in the 
pursuit of new competences in the form of new knowledge (Caves, 1996; Rugman, 1977). 
Although a subsidiary potentially simultaneously pursues multiple strategies, we follow the 
approach of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), White and Poynter (1984), Caves (1996), and 
Oladottir et al. (2012) to focus on the dominant strategy that is most central to the subsidiary 
activities2,3.  
Subsequently, to show the conceptualised relationships, we provide a conceptual 
framework (Figure 1).   
 
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
  In developing the conceptual framework, we have drawn on the resource-
dependency view and literature on MNE strategy and structure (Luo, 2005; Nohria and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Prahalad and Doz, 1987), to argue  that how a subsidiary is structurally 
embedded is likely to be associated with the dominant strategy it pursues in the host location. 
Specifically, subsidiaries are provided with access to existing MNE resources so that the 
combination of capabilities becomes possible through internal collaboration (Barney, 1991; 
Cantwell, 1994). Hence, under the earlier-defined corporate-embedded subsidiaries are highly 
headquarter-dependent for strategic and operational resource exchanges. Such a subsidiary is 
prominent under the global structure whereby autonomy is low, as the subsidiary is mainly 
                                                          
2 In this study we do not consider vertical integration strategy (which concerns the manufacturing sector) as it is 
not relevant  in the case of IT MNEs. 
3 Further discussion on this is provided in Methodology section. 
concerned with adapting the products to the local markets and leveraging home competencies 
abroad (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). In strategy literature, this approach is termed the 
market-seeking ‘horizontal integration strategy’ (Caves, 1996). Such a strategy arises as a 
substitute for exporting and from a desire to place production close to customers and thereby 
avoid trade costs (Buckley and Casson, 1981). The subsidiary strategy then becomes one to 
expand its market based on existing capabilities at home. Therefore, while most capabilities 
are built at home where most key value chain activities reside, headquarters play an important 
role in coordinating product and process transfer to subsidiaries (Buckley, 2009). Birkinshaw 
and Morrison (1995) refer to them as the local implementers. Therefore, drawing on the 
resource-dependency view, we conceptualise that when the subsidiary is more heavily 
dependent on its headquarters for strategic and operational resources it is likely to have a low 
level of autonomy and a high degree of direct control from headquarters (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989). Subsequently, the strategy implemented by this type of subsidiary is likely to 
be that of horizontal integration as a result of corporate embeddedness. We derive the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. When the subsidiary is corporately embedded, its dominant strategy is 
horizontal integration.  
 
Under the definition of network embeddedness, subsidiaries are more heavily 
dependent on other subsidiaries and regional headquarters. Such a subsidiary is not directly 
controlled by headquarters to a great degree but nor is it highly autonomous. Instead, it is 
individualistically interdependent in relation to the internal and external environment 
(Papanastassiou and Pearce, 2009). This embeddedness is most prominent under the 
interdependent network structure of the MNE whereby the strategic focus of the subsidiary is 
centred on relative operating efficiency, market scanning, and exploitation of emerging 
opportunities in the marketplace (Ghoshal, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Luo, 1999). To 
achieve this, many of the subsidiaries are responsible for various important MNE-wide value 
chain activities in different locations and these activities are undertaken in close coordination 
with the rest of the MNE (White and Poynter, 1984; Oladottir et al., 2012). For instance, 
lateral integration strategy allows the breaking up of the production value chain to relocate to 
lower-cost countries (Braconier et al., 2005; Dunning, 2003) or relocating knowledge-
intensive activities for the pursuit of new knowledge (Hashai and Almor, 2008; Mabey and 
Zhao 2016). Hence, when all MNE subsidiary activities are extensively laterally integrated, 
subsidiaries are able to benefit from as many economies of scale and scope as possible while 
maintaining the ability to respond to national interests and preferences (Jarillo and Martinez, 
1990; Oladottir et al., 2012). Subsidiaries with this strategy tend to experience higher levels 
of return in many instances due to the fact that operational and market orientation flexibility 
reduces their dependency and vulnerability in the local environments while the subsidiary 
also benefits from worldwide operational efficiency and product improvements and 
innovations (Kogut, 1985). Therefore, drawing on the resource-dependency view, we 
conceptualise that when the subsidiary is more heavily dependent on other subsidiaries or 
regional headquarters for strategic and/or operational resources, it is likely to be 
simultaneously independent of and dependent on the rest of the MNE network. Subsequently, 
the strategy followed by this type of subsidiary is likely to be of lateral or vertical integration 
as a result of network embeddedness. We derive the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1b. When the subsidiary is network embedded, its dominant strategy is vertical or 
lateral integration. 
 Local embeddedness is a term used to describe the extent to which a subsidiary’s 
individual, direct relationships with customers, suppliers, competitors, etc., can serve as 
sources of learning (Andersson et al., 2002; Yamin and Andersson, 2011). When these 
partners are strongly tied to each other, they are more capable of exchanging information, and 
therefore can learn more from each other (Andersson, 2003; Andersson et al., 2002). Such a 
subsidiary is prominent under the decentralised structure whereby subsidiaries tend to focus 
on sensing and exploiting local market opportunities (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Luo, 2001; 
Mudambi, 1999). Such a strategy is often termed ‘diversification’. One emphasis of this 
strategy is on product innovation efforts to enhance local outputs by developing existing and 
new products and expanding in the local market. Therefore, it is less likely to be heavily 
concerned with manufacturing and other functional costs. Rather, these subsidiaries place a 
strong emphasis on communicating and building presence in the local market so as to capture 
and capitalise on emerging market opportunities beyond the MNE. Under this strategic option, 
subsidiaries are often found to develop diversified or unrelated products, technology, or 
markets from the rest of the MNE as a result of the local market (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; 
Hada et al., 2013). Due to their local-market orientation, these ‘strategic-independent’ 
subsidiaries tend to develop and retain capabilities locally for responding to local changes, 
which means they undertake most of the value chain activities in a way that is relatively 
independent and self-sufficient of their headquarters and other leading subsidiaries. This 
leads to a more self-reliant type of structural embeddedness (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989, 
Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Yamin, 1999). Hence, this type of subsidiary strategy is closely 
associated with a market environment where there is a high level of local responsiveness and 
learning, and a low level of global integration (Luo, 1999). Therefore, drawing on the 
resource-dependency view, we conceptualise that when the MNE and its subsidiary are more 
heavily dependent on the local counterparts for strategic and operational resources, it is likely 
to have a high level of autonomy away from both headquarters’ and leader subsidiary direct 
control (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Subsequently, local learning is facilitated by such a high 
autonomy and therefore the subsidiary tends to develop idiosyncratic capabilities.  Hoenen et 
al. (2014) reach a similar conclusion when they investigated the entrepreneurial capabilities 
of regional headquarters which are augmented through their linkages with local subsidiaries. 
The strategy of this type of subsidiary is likely to be of diversification. Thus, we derive the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1c. When the subsidiary is self-reliantly embedded, its dominant strategy is 
diversification. 
 
Further, regional context has long been recognised as contributing to the 
embeddedness and strategy of MNEs (Dunning, 2001; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004). Previous 
research into the concentration of sales data on 320 MNEs suggests an average of over 80% 
of sales is in the home region, which further confirms the impact of the location factor 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2004) Therefore, we conceptualise that worldwide regional 
categorisation is likely to impact on the relationship between subsidiary embeddedness and 
strategy due to the idiosyncratic characteristics of each  destination/ host region (Dunning, 
2001; Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). Hence, we conceptualise a potential regional effect on 
subsidiary embeddedness and strategy association and we derive the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2. Subsidiary location is likely to impact the relation between types of internal 
structural embeddedness and subsidiary strategy.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
Empirical Context 
 
The IT industry has a highly diversified nature, reflected by composing information 
technology and telecom hardware manufacturers, telecom operators and software and 
computer service firms (Desruelle and Stancik, 2013). The IT industry’s long history, which 
starts in the early 1980s, has been marked by IBM’s loss of control of its supply chain 
platform in the computer industry, which in turn gave rise to independent software providers 
(Gawer, 2009). Software providers in particular, such as Microsoft, started offering digital 
products plug compatible with IBM’s platform (Gawer, 2009). In the late 1980s, a dominant 
platform, Wintel, emerged in the software industry and set up a new competitive dynamic 
(Gawer, 2009). Wintel was an industry platform, developed from Intel’s intense innovation in 
microprocessors (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) and Microsoft’s central role in providing the 
operating systems necessary for the hardware manufacturers. Intel and Microsoft offer this 
open platform and invited other software developers to provide complementary applications 
and services. Microsoft’s central place in the PC manufacturing industry, due to their offering 
of the dominating operating system, allows them to benefit from competition among PC 
manufactures while bargaining for better prices (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). Considering 
the software industry’s history, it becomes apparent that it is a complex environment where 
supply chains are not evident and the different firms collaborate and compete as part of 
industry platforms. Thus corporate strategy such as vertical integration should be investigated 
with caution. Moreover, the software industry platforms are led by some key players and 
other firms participate as complementors in these business networks. These firms offer 
complementary software products which are compatible with the platform and provide value-
adding services to the customers. As such they are not suppliers but rather are co-creators.  
 The intense technological developments that redefined the IT industry structure have 
attracted most of the research interest in the field, as the empirical research results show. 
Research from strategic management literature focuses on the firms’ growth and expansion 
by mainly viewing it as system-based competition and investigating how innovation in 
complementary technologies drives hyper-competition among the key players (e.g. Lee at al., 
2010). The recent technological developments of open source (Fitzgerald, 2006), as well as 
cloud computing and software as a service (Susarla et al., 2009; Kauffman and Tsai, 2009) 
have led to disruptive changes in the IT industry and further intensified competition.  
 We believe that the complex nature of the IT industry provides an interesting research 
setting in which to investigate the research model. Despite the increasing number of empirical 
studies of the strategies of large IT firms, we are still extremely restricted in our knowledge 
regarding the strategic role of subsidiaries and subsidiary embeddedness. Taking into account 
that it is a prerequisite for their subsidiaries to tap into local knowledge in order to deliver 
localised products and services (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009) and for internal knowledge 
transfer, this study is a timely examination of the relationship between subsidiaries’ multiple 
embeddedness and strategy. 
 
Sample Selection and Methods of Analysis 
 
In order to empirically investigate the research hypotheses, eight of the top ten IT MNEs 
from the Fortune 500 List were chosen.  To do this, we first define our sample according to 
the four-digit SIC classification4. The main source of SIC classification is Orbis database by 
Bureau van Dijk. These eight firms were chosen based on their revenues and market shares 
being the largest across the period of ten years. To collect data, a sample of their subsidiaries 
was taken from the Corporate Affiliations Directory and resulted in data collection from a 
purposive sample of 2107 subsidiaries.  To undertake this sampling process, we first use a 
clear definition of the ‘ultimate parent’ in identifying the headquarters and the subsidiaries it 
‘owns’. For identifying the former, we draw on the standard applied in Corporate Affiliations 
Directory to define the ‘ultimate parent’ as the topmost responsible entity within the 
corporate hierarchy. In terms of subsidiary ownership, we rely on information from the 
databases of direct shareholdings by the ultimate parent. Despite the rapid pace of change in 
the IT industry, key players have retained the largest market shares for the last decade. Data 
were collected from this source for a number of variables recorded between the years 2004 
and 2009 and we choose to collect the data in 2009. We purposely select this period as the 
largest IT companies dominating the industry had a relatively stable organizational structure 
in terms of their key business areas. Immediately after this period, the global IT industry was 
seriously hit by the global economic crisis and the whole industry went through a complete 
restructuring (Desruelle and Stancik, 2013), which would not make any of this a more 
representative period.  
 We also construct the strategy and embeddedness variables by comparing the four-
digit SIC classification of each subsidiary in the sample with that of its ultimate parent5.  
Following Palepu (1985) we relate the industrial specialization of the overseas unit with that 
of its ultimate parent by using the four-digit SIC classification for each overseas unit and that 
                                                          
4 The SIC code 7372 represents: Pre-packaged software. The SIC code 3577 represents: Computer peripheral 
equipment, not elsewhere specified. The SIC code 3579 represents: Office machines, not elsewhere specified.  
The SIC codes for the sample are: 7372 – Adobe, Computer Associates, Microsoft, Oracle, SAP, and Symantec; 
3577 – HP; 3579 – IBM. HP and IBM are very close to 7372 as approx. 85% sales revenue is from software 
5 For a detailed justification of the use of four-digit SIC codes in defining industrial specialisation see Palepu, 
1985 and Oladottir et al., 2012. 
of its ultimate parent.  As most of the foreign units had multiple industrial profiles, i.e., more 
than one 4-digit SIC industrial classification, the data and business description of each unit 
with  cross-verification of the industrial classification of the parent and overseas units by 
consulting ORBIS of Bureau Van Dijk and Corporate Affiliations. This allowed us to 
distinguish the primary or core 4-digit SIC classification of the foreign unit and to benchmark 
it against the primary 4-digit industry specialisation of the parent (Altmonote and Rungi, 
2013). This necessary exercise allowed us to derive the following strategies: horizontal 
integration, lateral integration, and diversification (Oladottir et al., 2012). It thus becomes 
apparent that one major distinction of the IT industry is the absence of vertical integration 
strategies.  Two researchers assess each subsidiary separately and then compare their results 
to identify and reconcile potential differences. The confirmed three constructs become the 
dependent variables. 6 
 For subsidiary embeddedness variable construction, we also refer to Corporate 
Affiliations Directory and Orbis. Both databases include a hierarchy variable named 
‘reporting’ which shows the length of the organisational command chain linking each 
subsidiary to the ultimate parent (Altomonte and Rungi 2013:8) . This variable was applied in 
Oladottir et al (2012) in order to capture the structure of the internal MNE hierarchy as 
foreign subsidiaries have different reporting nodes. Although the hierarchical history of 
MNEs shows that there can be more than one relationship between subsidiaries and other 
internal stakeholders, in order to measure the hierarchical distance we focus on the length 
between a subsidiary and its ultimate parent along the command chain (Andersson and 
Forsgren, 1996: 491; Sismek et al, 2003) 7. We thus capture a pure dyadic relationship as it 
                                                          
6 Similarly, Altomonte and Rungi (2013:14) identify affiliates and parents industrial profiles  at “6-digit NAICS 
rev. 2002”  
7 The same variable is applied in the latest World Investment Report (2016) which introduces the term 
hierarchical depth of an MNE group by identifying the maximum hierarchical distance between a parent and 
affiliates (p. 143).  Altomonte and Rungi (2013)  also construct hierarchical graphs and depict relationships 
can be seen “from above” (Andersson and Forsgren, 1996: 491)8.  Therefore, based on the 
organizational chart of tiered subsidiaries (with tier one being directly below headquarter, tier 
two being directly under tier one, and so forth), we are able to identify the  three levels of 
subsidiary embeddedness: when a subsidiary reports directly to corporate headquarters (the 
‘reporting’ indicator shows ‘1’ which represents the closest distance between headquarters 
and the subsidiary) – we define this type of structural embeddedness as corporate 
embeddedness; when a subsidiary reports directly to regional headquarters and other leading 
subsidiaries rather than corporate headquarters (the ‘reporting’ indicator shows ‘2’,’3’,or ‘4’, 
which represents the greater distance to the headquarters but the closest distance with the rest 
of the MNE network) – we define this type of structural embeddedness as network 
embeddedness; and when a subsidiary reports directly to other subsidiaries only and not to 
corporate or regional headquarters or leading subsidiaries (the ‘reporting’ indicator shows ‘5’ 
or over, which represents the furthest distance to the headquarters and the rest of the network) 
– we define this type of structural embeddedness as self-reliant embeddedness. By our 
definition, when one or more subsidiaries report directly to another subsidiary, that subsidiary 
is referred to as the ‘leading subsidiary’. The leading subsidiary reports directly to corporate 
or regional headquarters. In a similar way to that used in the first assessment, the same 
researchers matched available data for each reporting type of structural embeddedness from 
the databases with the definitions presented above.  These three constructs are our 
independent variables. Moreover, we identify the subsidiary host environment (per continent) 
as the mediating variable in the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. 
In total, the following variables were recorded for each subsidiary: ‘parent company’, 
‘subsidiary strategy’ (categorised as ‘diversification’, ‘horizontal integration’, and ‘lateral 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
between affiliates and parent by using the same hierarchy variable as it is reported in the ownership databases of 
Bureau van Dijk and Orbis 
8 Whilst we acknowledge the subjective relational measures of embeddedness used in prior research, the notion 
of internal network ‘hierarchy’ also functions to reflect the degree of internal (structural) embeddedness and 
thus is not concerned with subjective views of subsidiaries in terms of relatedness. 
integration’) and ‘subsidiary embeddedness’ (categorised as ‘corporate embeddedness’, 
‘network embeddedness’, and ‘self-reliant embeddedness’) and ‘host environment of the 
subsidiary’ (country, continent). 
 For data analysis, in order to address the possible associations between the 
independent and dependent variables, as well as the mediating variable, and thus answer the 
hypotheses, we choose to use contingency tables over methods of econometrics to ensure we 
can specifically identify the central question of ‘possible associations’ with which this study 
is concerned. Hypotheses are tested using a series of cross-tabulations and Chi-square Tests 
of Independence in order to measure any potential associations between the variables through 
displaying of frequency distribution (Smith and Albaum 2004). Furthermore, we analyse the 
data by categories of counts, percentages, and contribution to Chi-square in order to identify 
specific associations and their significance. Our data is made up of Adobe with 3% of the 
subsidiaries, Computer Associates (4%), HP (23%), IBM (33%), Microsoft (9%), Oracle 
(13%), SAP (12%) and Symantec (3%).  For the strategy variable, 946 (51%) of the 
subsidiaries were categorized as diversification, 458 (24%) were horizontal integration, and 
462 (25%) were lateral integration9. For the embeddedness variable, 696 (37.3%) of the 
subsidiaries were categorised as self-reliant embeddedness, 584 (31.3%) as corporate 
embeddedness, and 586 (31.4%) as network embeddedness. 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 Table 1 also shows that, whilst diversification is the most followed strategy across the 
sample population (946), it is clear that there is no industry-dominant strategy across the 
                                                          
9 Of the total population of 2107 subsidiaries surveyed, there are 241 missing values of the strategy variable. 
sample MNEs we have chosen, as two follow the horizontal integration strategy, three the 
lateral integration strategy, and another three the diversification strategy. Further, we aim to 
explore the potential regional effect on the association between subsidiary embeddedness and 
strategy. We test the association between the two variables whilst controlling for the 
continent within which the subsidiary was located. After examining the sample, we group the 
subsidiaries, depending on their location, into four continents: North America (excluding 
Mexico), Europe, Asia, and Africa. The sample included 19 subsidiaries in Africa (1%), 374 
in North America (20%), 410 in Asia (22%), 17 in Australia (1%) and 1048 in Europe (56%). 
For analysis purposes, because of low numbers, Australia, which was grouped with Asia in a 
single category labelled ‘Asia’, with 427 subsidiaries, as well as Africa with 19 subsidiaries, 
were excluded from the test for regional variation10. 
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE II HERE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
                                                          
10 The analysis shows that for both Africa and Asia, the expected cell counts were less than five in nine and two 
cells of the table respectively.  This suggests that the Chi-square Test would not be valid, hence they are not 
included. 
 
4. Findings 
 
We undertake three areas of test analysis. In the first area, using the final sample of 1866 
subsidiaries worldwide of the top eight MNEs at the time of data collection, we test the level 
of significance of the association between various degrees of structural embeddedness and 
strategy (whereby ‘internal structural embeddedness’ is the independent or explanatory 
variable and ‘strategy’ is the dependent variable); for the second area, using the same set of 
data, we test for associations between specific levels of subsidiary embeddedness and specific 
types of subsidiary strategy; and in area three, we test for associations within different 
subsidiary locations.  
 The results in Table 3 show that both the Pearson and the Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 
Tests are significant (p< 0.05), and therefore: There is evidence to suggest that there is a 
significant relationship between the subsidiary structural embeddedness variable and the 
subsidiary strategy variable. This result provides important empirical support to our 
proposition on the association between the two variables in the case of eight IT MNEs.  
---------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE III HERE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 The specific relationships between sub-variables are also shown in Table 3. 
Specifically, for Hypothesis 1a, which states that subsidiary corporate embeddedness and 
headquarter-dependency are associated primarily with the subsidiary horizontal integration 
strategy, the results of Table 3 show support for this proposition as among 620 subsidiaries 
are classified as having  high corporate embeddedness and the largest proportion (39%) of 
them follow the dominant horizontal integration strategy in comparison with 33% of them 
following the diversification strategy and only 28% following the lateral integration strategy.  
 As for Hypothesis 1b, which states that subsidiary network embeddedness and 
interdependent-individualism is most likely to be associated with the subsidiary lateral 
integration strategy, the result in Table 3 did not confirm the proposition as, of 562 
subsidiaries of high network-embeddedness, the largest majority (47%) follow the 
diversification rather than the lateral integration (28%) or horizontal integration strategy 
(25%). The findings on diversification (47%) suggest that subsidiary network embeddedness 
and interdependent-individualism are strongly associated with subsidiary product or market 
diversification as the dominant strategy.  
 The results in Table 3 strongly support our Hypothesis 1c, which states that 
subsidiary self-reliant embeddedness and strategic independence are associated with the 
subsidiary diversification strategy. Among 684 subsidiaries of high self-reliant embeddedness, 
the largest majority (70%) of them follow the diversification strategy in comparison to 19% 
following the lateral integration strategy and 11% following the horizontal integration 
strategy.  
 In addition to the findings for the hypotheses, Table 3 further shows that the most 
dominant relationship across the whole sample population is self-reliant embeddedness and 
strategic independence associated with the diversification strategy (26%). This could 
potentially reflect the criticality of knowledge-seeking for IT MNEs through diversifying 
their products and markets on a constant basis, and high local embeddedness is potentially 
therefore the most facilitating of this strategic option. Reversely, self-reliant embeddedness is 
arguably the least facilitating of the horizontal integration strategy (4%). The explanation 
here is that the two cells representing the (expected) relationship between corporate 
embeddedness and the horizontal integration strategy and between local embeddedness and 
the diversification strategy are furthest from the expected counts required for confirmation of 
the independence of variables. Hence, as they show the most deviation from the expected 
frequencies, they make the largest contribution to the Chi-square Test result. Conversely, for 
the other two cells representing the (unexpected) association between local embeddedness 
and the horizontal integration strategy and between corporate embeddedness and the 
diversification strategy, they also show the most deviation from the expected frequencies and 
therefore make the largest contributions.  Therefore, while the two unexpected cells are 
significant in terms of the lowest associations, the more important finding is that the two 
expected cells reflect the highest significance of the associations, which further confirms the 
relevant hypotheses.  
 
The moderating effect of subsidiary’s host location 
 
We further explore the data set by controlling for the ‘continent’ in which individual 
subsidiaries are located. Test results for each region are shown below:  
 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES IV & V HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
 The analysis of 1048 subsidiaries located in Europe shows there is a significant 
relationship between structural embeddedness and strategy for subsidiaries located in 
Europe (Chi Square=23.211, p<0.01). This finding supports Hypothesis 2 and corresponds 
to the first finding for the whole sample population. Specifically, in Table 4, it is first noted 
that subsidiaries in Europe that are headquarter-dependent are more likely to have a 
diversification strategy than if they are corporate-embedded (40% against 30%).  This is 
surprising as it rejects the main findings of hypothesis 1a but instead argues that for those 
which are highly corporate embedded, the most dominant strategy among the subsidiaries in 
Europe is diversification. Next, the results show that subsidiaries in Europe that are 
interdependent-individualistic are more likely to follow the diversification strategy rather 
than the proposed lateral integration strategy (52% against 22%). This result shares the same 
conclusion as the main finding and again rejects our 1b (which is also rejected in the main 
finding) that high subsidiary network embeddedness is associated with lateral integration. 
Finally, the data suggests that self-reliant embeddedness is most likely to be associated with 
the diversification strategy (52% against 16% and 32%), which strongly supports our initial 
expectations. On another note, Table 4 shows that while there are dominant relationships, 
there are also less dominant associations involving supplementary strategies. This is similar 
to the main findings in Table 3. Cell significance is also similar to the main finding apart 
from the association between self-reliant embeddedness and diversification showing no 
significant contribution.  
 In terms of data on North America in Table 5, of the 372 subsidiaries located in the 
region: There is evidence to suggest that there is a significant relationship between structural 
embeddedness and strategy for subsidiaries located in North America (Chi-Square=12.985, 
p=0.011).  This further supports Hypothesis 2 and our main finding. Specifically, corporate 
embeddedness is most linked to horizontal integration (47% against 25% and 28%) and 
therefore confirms Hypothesis 1a. Network embeddedness is found to be associated with the 
lateral integration strategy (37% against 35% and 28%). This confirms our Hypothesis 1b. 
Finally, there is a strong association between subsidiary self-reliant embeddedness and the 
diversification strategy among subsidiaries located in North America (43% against 40% and 
17%), which is in line with Hypothesis 1c. On a different note, Table 5 shows that while there 
are dominant relationships, there are also less dominant involving supplementary strategies.  
This is similar to the main findings from Tables 3 and 4. Cell significance is also similar to 
the main finding apart from the association between corporate embeddedness and 
diversification showing no significant contribution.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
 Drawing on resource-dependency theory, subsidiary strategy and embeddedness 
literature we conceptualised the relationship between subsidiary structural embeddedness and 
strategy to suggest that the way in which a subsidiary is internally embedded in the MNE 
network influences its choice of strategy. Following the notion of structural embeddedness 
and measuring it through hierarchical distance (Rowley et al 2000; Sismek et al 2003), we 
further conceptualise that there are three levels of structural subsidiary embeddedness i.e. 
corporate, network, and self-reliant, which individually affect three types of subsidiary 
strategy. We offer strong indications that there is a direct and significant relationship between 
subsidiary embeddedness and strategy in the context of the IT sector. We also provide 
evidence of the impact of the specific subsidiary host environment on structural 
embeddedness and strategy.   
 First, our finding on the relationship between subsidiary corporate embeddedness and 
subsidiary horizontal integration strategy is in line with existing works of Caves (1996) and 
Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) which show that when subsidiaries are dependent on 
headquarters, they are more likely to be following a horizontal integration strategy. However, 
on the other hand, although the dominant strategy is confirmed, there are also associations 
found between corporate embeddedness and strategies of lateral integration and 
diversification. This creates further relationships between corporate embeddedness and 
subsidiary strategy. These two newly identified relationships could be seen as the secondary 
strategy of MNEs in that the subsidiaries sometimes co-follow the other types of strategy but 
as complementary to the dominant type (Oladottir et al, 2012).  
Second, our finding on the weak relationship between subsidiary network 
embeddedness and the lateral integration strategy is interesting and outside of our initial 
expectations. The explanation could be that for network embedded subsidiaries in the IT 
sector, while they are linked with peer subsidiaries for sharing and synergising knowledge 
resources and capabilities, the strategic focus is on undertaking differentiated innovation 
activities within individual subsidiaries (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002; Nohria and Ghoshal, 
1998); therefore, they are more likely to follow the diversification strategy for tapping into 
new knowledge domains, products, services, or markets (White and Poynter, 1984).   
On the other hand, it is still worth noting that in the case of network-embedded 
subsidiaries, lateral and horizontal integration strategies are also associated but as secondary 
to complement the main strategic activities   
Our third finding suggests a strong relationship between subsidiary self-reliant 
embeddedness and the diversification strategy. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that IT 
subsidiaries which are characterised as primarily strategic independent are following the 
diversification strategy for the very reason of knowledge creation and innovativeness. This 
can be explained by the work of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) and Hada et al. (2013) which 
states that a diversification strategy often enables the firm to expand into unknown territories 
of knowledge, product, or market. Therefore, only when the firm is deeply embedded in the 
local host environment should it be able to sense new opportunities and tap into new domains. 
This is particularly crucial for knowledge-intensive firms who must remain competitive in the 
form of new discoveries and developments (Luo, 1999; Yamin, 1999, 2001; Mudambi, 1999). 
However, it is also worth mentioning that the lateral and horizontal integration strategy is 
also associated with self-reliant embeddedness to arguably complement diversification 
strategy. 
Interpreting our results from the Granovetter’s weak ties and Burt’s structural holes 
contribution we do confirm that the furthest a subsidiary is associated with headquarters the 
higher the possibility to be engaged in innovative activities.  This is evident for the self- 
reliant embeddedness outcome which relates to diversification strategies and to a lesser 
extend for the network embeddedness which confirms that the lack of direct (strong) ties with 
headquarters can lead to  interactive and creative  linkages among subsidiaries. 
 Finally, we identified the mediating role of subsidiary host location in determining the 
relationship between subsidiary embeddedness and strategy. There is a significant difference 
between Europe-located subsidiaries and North-America-located subsidiaries when the 
impact of subsidiary structural embeddedness on strategy is examined. In the case of Europe, 
subsidiary corporate embeddedness is associated most extensively with the diversification 
strategy. This draws a completely different picture from the main findings and could 
potentially be explained by the strong emphasis IT MNE headquarters place on knowledge 
creation and market expansion through direct control of their diversified subsidiaries in 
Europe. On the contrary, for North America, the confirmation of a significant relationship 
between subsidiary network embeddedness and the lateral integration strategy (rejected by 
the main findings) reflects the more centralised management approach of the subsidiaries 
located in North America. It is likely that the subsidiaries located in this region are more 
centralised in their structure whilst the ones located in Europe tend to adopt a much more 
decentralised approach reflecting the fact that the vast majority of subsidiaries in our sample 
are of non-European origin. Based on the above, we derive a more affirmative model (Figure 
2). 
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 The model demonstrates that while two out of the three main hypotheses (1a and 1c) 
are confirmed with strong associations between the three levels of internal structural 
embeddedness and the three types of strategy across the whole sample population, the links 
between network embeddedness and interdependent-individualism and the lateral integration 
strategy are only strong when mediated by the location factor. In comparison, the other two 
hypotheses demonstrate the strong associations across the whole sample population. This 
informs us that, in the case of IT MNEs, corporate embeddedness is strongly linked to 
horizontal integration for the purpose of knowledge exploitation and local competitiveness; 
self-reliant embeddedness is strongly linked to the diversification strategy for the simple 
purpose of knowledge exploration and new product and/or market expansion. Moreover, 
these three types of strategy are not mutually exclusive as the model shows that each level of 
embeddedness represents associations with all three types of strategy; however the weighting 
of these associations differs. In other words, when the majority of corporate embedded 
subsidiaries are associated with the dominant horizontal integration strategies, lateral 
integration and diversification strategies are also linked to corporate embeddedness. This 
categorisation of primary and secondary strategies followed by MNEs can potentially draw a 
picture of the strategic transition of subsidiaries from one type to another. This is in line with 
the work of Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) who argue that subsidiaries evolve in terms of their 
strategy and embeddedness as they become increasingly established in a foreign location. 
Capabilities and charter change are found to take place. Taking the self-reliant embeddedness 
and diversification link as another example, the categorisation also implies that IT MNEs are 
not only concerned with knowledge creation but also interested in achieving horizontal and 
lateral integration. In conclusion, despite the fact that diversification is typically the most 
dominant strategy as reflected in the refined model for the IT sector, the relationships 
between multiple subsidiary embeddedness and types of subsidiary strategy are much more 
complex than we anticipated. Instead, what is reflected by the results and the refined model is 
that IT MNEs have many similar strategic concerns as MNEs of the traditional manufacturing 
sector, such as knowledge exploitation, efficiency, and market seeking, and that location is 
indeed a factor in how IT MNEs structure and strategize their global operations.  
 
Theoretical Contribution 
 
A growing body of literature has been addressing the importance of embeddedness or 
strategy in relation to MNE performance. We contribute to this research stream by expanding 
the theoretical view and conceptualise the interplayed links between subsidiary internal 
structural embeddedness and subsidiary strategic options. Our results show that there are 
multiple relationships between three levels of structural embeddedness and three types of 
strategy in the IT sector. We further show that subsidiary location strongly mediates the 
relationships. Structural embeddedness indeed determines strategy.  
 First, we extend the concept of structural embeddedness into the context of subsidiary 
structural embeddedness whereby three levels of structural embeddedness are identified. 
Second, by theorising about the association between subsidiary structural embeddedness and 
subsidiary strategy, our research sheds light on the specific influence of three distinct levels 
of structural embeddedness on the three different strategic options at subsidiary level. We 
demonstrate that there are multilinear relationships between corporate, network, and self-
reliant embeddedness and horizontal integration, lateral integration, and diversification 
strategies. Specifically, we identify that each subsidiary strategy is associated with multiple 
levels of embeddedness, which reflects the multi-linearity. However, previous research 
implies that a particular strategy only corresponds to a given embeddedness (e.g. Chen and 
Cannice, 2006; Subramaniam and Watson, 2006). Furthermore, we show that these multiple 
associations vary in terms of their importance in determining the strategy, whereby some are 
dominant and others are secondary. In contrast, previous research seems to imply subsidiary 
local strategy reflects only one type of organisational embeddedness (Luo, 1999).  
 Our study also contributes to the understanding of how the subsidiary host 
environment influences the associations between structural embeddedness and the observed 
strategy (Andersson et al., 2005; Dunning, 2001). We demonstrate that location has a strong 
mediating role in some of the associations. Specifically, we show that corporate 
embeddedness is not only significantly associated with the horizontal integration strategy but 
also the diversification strategy when mediated by subsidiary location. Reversely, network 
embeddedness is significantly associated with lateral integration only when mediated by 
subsidiary location.  
 
Managerial Implications 
 
     Our findings help corporate managers to better understand the complex relationships 
between structural embeddedness and strategy in order to adapt to the dynamic host 
environment and maintain the competitiveness of the subsidiary. 
 In particular, our affirmative model reflects two related managerial concerns: on the 
one hand, the multiple linkages found between embeddedness and the strategy of the IT 
MNEs could potentially suggest an organisational inefficiency as a result of misalignment 
between strategy and embeddedness; on a positive note, it could also be a reflection of the 
transition taking place in the MNEs, whereby some subsidiaries were evolving from one type 
of embeddedness and strategy to another, which could also reflect a shift in the IT industry. 
Our result of multiple linkages could potentially inform us that, in spite of the sector 
differences, increasingly fewer MNEs can sustain global competitiveness under a pure form 
of structure, i.e. centralised or decentralised. Instead, there is a growing imperative to 
converge towards the mid-point of the two – which is the interdependent network structure 
whereby subsidiaries pursue a mix of market, efficiency, and knowledge seeking strategies 
simultaneously (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). This further reflects the wider environmental 
forces at work to create necessary pressure for MNEs to transform (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
2000; Yu, 2011). Therefore, corporate managers must be constantly alert to environmental 
changes, and seek the most effective and efficient organisational arrangement. In our research 
into the top eight performing IT MNEs, we found that it is the interdependent network 
structure and pursuit of multiple strategies simultaneously which should set good learning 
examples for others.   
 
Limitations and Future Research  
 
In addition to several strengths, including a large dataset of eight top IT MNEs located 
across multiple regions, limitations have to be noted. We collected data from 2009 with the 
intention of selecting a more stable period of the industry before technological innovations 
led to the drastic organisational change of many MNEs which were moving away from 
concentration on industry platforms towards complex types of digital ecosystems competing 
with digital giants such as Google in a huge variety of markets. Under the new structure, 
customers have become co-producers of knowledge and co-creators of value. Future research 
should explore this evolving new structure in the industry by incorporating new stakeholders 
in the network of counterparts.  Therefore, while the period we selected is more 
representative of the industry in the traditional sense, we encourage further research to 
investigate the structural and strategic shifts as a result of the recent industry restructure. 
Second, we suggest further research to enhance the generalisability of our results by drawing 
on a large empirical sample across multiple industries and sectors.  Third, we used subjective 
measures in deciding on the classification of the three levels of embeddedness. Although this 
approach is found in works such as Andersson et al (2002) where subjective judgement is 
sought, we acknowledge the potential bias. Although we introduced reporting structure as the 
measure, the network embeddedness classification was the most difficult to produce. While 
we selected reporting distances of 2, 3, and 4, to be classified as network embedded in our 
study, the subjective classification of reporting distances 2 and 3 could also be justifiable. To 
enhance the validity of the classification adopted, we encourage future studies to triangulate 
such measure. 
Further, although in this paper we established the interplay between structural 
embeddedness and strategy, we call for future research to further explore the determinants of 
this dynamically evolving relationship. Moreover, our measure of structural embeddedness 
draws on the notion of structural network ‘hierarchy’ to provide a ‘view from above’.  Thus, 
it does not provide the subjective dimension of (relational) embeddedness. Further research 
can address issues of how subsidiaries evolve and interact within the MNE group in relation 
to strategy. Last, although our study focuses on structural embeddedness, further research can 
examine in-depth the specific role of external embeddedness in relation to subsidiary 
strategies.   
In conclusion, this paper extends subsidiary embeddedness and strategy literature by 
conceptualising and testing subsidiary concurrent embeddedness in leading to different 
subsidiary strategic options by focusing on structural embeddedness which is relatively 
neglected in the international business literature. Thus, building on the notion of structural 
embeddedness, we offer three levels of structural embeddedness (corporate, network, and 
self-reliant) and identify three types of strategy (horizontal integration, lateral integration, and 
diversification) appropriate for the IT sector. Our study of 1866 subsidiaries across four 
continents shows the interplay between levels of subsidiary embeddedness and strategic 
options. Regional location is also found to be an important moderator of the interaction. An 
affirmative model of the interplay is provided. 
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Figure 1. Framework of Subsidiary Structural Embeddedness and Strategy 
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 Table 1. Strategy Type Distribution per Company 
 Count of Strategy Type 
Parent 
Company 
Horizontal 
Integration 
Lateral 
Integration 
Diversifica
-tion   
     Grand Total 
       
Adobe 14   *31  13 58 
Computer 
Associates *41  14  31 86 
HP 122  91  *215 428 
IBM 106  80  *394 580 
Microsoft 22  51  *109 182 
Oracle *108  72  83 263 
SAP 29  *96  84 209 
Symantec 16  *27  17 60 
   
   
 
  
Grand Total 458 
 
462  946 1866 
(NB: * represents the dominant strategy per MNE) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Subsidiary Location Distribution 
Continent Europe North America Asia (inc. 
Australia) 
Africa  
     
No. of subsidiaries 1048 374 427 19 
Sample size 56% 20% 23% 1% 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Level of Embeddedness by Type of Strategy 
      
Subsidiary Embeddedness  Subsidiary Strategy  
  Horizontal 
Integration 
Lateral 
Integration 
Diversification Total 
Corporate Embeddedness/ 
Headquarter Dependency 
Count 242 174 204 620 
 % of Total 13% 9% 11% 33% 
 % within Row 39% 28% 33% 100% 
 Contribution 
to Chi-square 
*53 3 *39 N/A 
Network Embeddedness/ 
Interdependent-
individualism 
Count 142 159 261 562 
 % of Total 7% 9% 14% 30% 
 % within Row 25% 28% 47% 100% 
 Contribution 
to Chi-square 
0 3 2 N/A 
Self-reliant 
Embeddedness/ 
Strategic Independence 
Count 74 129 481 684 
 % of Total 4% 7% 26% 37% 
 % within Row 11% 19% 70% 100% 
 Contribution 
to Chi-square 
*53 10 *52 N/A 
      
Total  Count 458 462 946 1866 
 % of Total 24% 25% 51% 100% 
 % within Row 24% 25% 51% 100% 
 
Pearson Chi-square = 213.516, DF = 4, P – Value = 0.000; Likelihood Ratio Chi-square = 219.983, DF = 4, P-Value = 0.000 
(NB: * represents the most significant cells of contribution to Chi-square; All numbers are rounded to the nearest 1) 
 
  
Table 4. Europe: Level of Embeddedness by Type of Strategy 
      
Subsidiary Embeddedness  Subsidiary Strategy  
  Horizontal 
Integration 
Lateral 
Integration 
Diversification Total 
Corporate Embeddedness/ 
Headquarter Dependency 
Count 101 100 135 336 
 % of Total 10% 9% 13% 32% 
 % within Row 30%   30% 40% 100% 
 Contribution 
to Chi-square 
*7 0 *5 N/A 
Network Embeddedness/ 
Interdependent-
individualism 
Count 92 105 214 411 
 % of Total 9% 10% 20% 39% 
 % within Row 22% 26% 52% 100% 
 Contribution 
to Chi-square 
0 1 1 N/A 
Self-reliant 
Embeddedness/ 
Strategic Independence 
Count 48 96 157 301 
 % of Total 5% 9% 15% 29% 
 % within Row 16% 32% 52% 100% 
 Contribution 
to Chi-square 
*6 1 1 N/A 
Total  Count 241 301 506 1048 
 % of Total 23% 29% 48% 100% 
 % within Row 23% 29% 48% 100% 
      
Pearson Chi-squre = 23.211, DF = 4, P – Value = 0.000; Likelihood Ratio Chi-square = 23.595, DF = 4, P-Value = 0.000 
(NB: * represents the most significant cells of contribution to Chi-square; All numbers are rounded to the nearest 1) 
 
  
 
Table 5. North America: Level of Embeddedness by Type of Strategy 
      
Subsidiary Embeddedness  Subsidiary Strategy  
  Horizontal 
Integration 
Lateral 
Integration 
Diversification Total 
Corporate Embeddedness/ 
Headquarter Dependency 
Count 111 67 59 237 
 % of Total 30% 18% 16% 64% 
 % within Row 47% 28% 25% 100% 
 Contribution 
to Chi-square 
*2 1 0 N/A 
Network Embeddedness/ 
Interdependent-
individualism 
Count 37 39 29 105 
 % of Total 10% 10% 8% 28% 
 % within Row 35% 37% 28% 100% 
 Contribution 
to Chi-square 
1 1 0 N/A 
Self-reliant 
Embeddedness/ 
Strategic Independence 
Count 5 12 13 30 
 % of Total 1% 3% 4% 8% 
 % within Row 17% 40% 43% 100% 
 Contribution 
to Chi-square 
*4 1 *3 N/A 
Total  Count 153 118 101 372 
 % of Total 41% 32% 27% 100% 
 % within Row 41% 32% 27% 100% 
      
Pearson Chi-square = 12.985, DF = 4, P – Value = 0.011; Likelihood Ratio Chi-square = 13.727, DF = 4, P-Value = 0.008 
(NB: * represents the most significant cells of contribution to Chi-square; All numbers are rounded to the nearest 1) 
 
